Will he or won’t he? Last year, at the same time, this question was on everyone’s lips. Russian President Vladimir Putin had massed nearly 200,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders. US intelligence had warned that Russia was preparing for all-out war. All the clues pointed to an imminent attack, except for one major element: it seemed unthinkable.
It is true that Russia attacked Ukraine in 2014 and in the spring of 2021 staged a dress rehearsal for an invasion scenario, reinforcing its troops on the border before sending them home. Putin seemed increasingly irritated by kyiv’s refusal to bend to his will. He openly derided Ukrainian national identity and sovereignty. The shock was however great when the Russian forces launched the assault, and it was clear that a power endowed with nuclear weapons in 2022 could seek to conquer a neighbor by force without having been provoked. War has devastated Ukraine; it also darkened the world situation for a long time. Ten conflicts to watch
For Russia, the result so far is catastrophic. An offensive that was meant to subjugate Ukraine, weaken the West and strengthen the Kremlin has so far done the exact opposite. It gave a boost to Ukrainian nationalism and pushed kyiv closer to Europe. It breathed new life into NATO, which was adrift. Finland’s and Sweden’s membership in the organization, which appears to be on track, will significantly alter the balance of power in Northern Europe and more than double the length of Russia’s borders with EU member states. NATO. The war has exposed weaknesses in the Russian military that its operations in Syria (2015) and Ukraine (2014 and 2015) had masked. It demonstrated the determination and the competence of the West, that the fiascos of Afghanistan, Ten conflicts to watch
However, the war is far from over. The Russian economy has adapted to the heavy sanctions imposed by the West. The Kremlin seems convinced that Russia has the necessary stamina. Moscow could still impose an unsatisfactory settlement and create a problematic precedent that carries the risk of aggression elsewhere. If, on the other hand, Putin felt genuinely in danger, due to Ukrainian advances or for other reasons, it is not impossible – unlikely, but difficult to completely rule out – that he would use nuclear weapons as a last resort. . Whatever happens in Ukraine, the West and Russia will likely remain on a perilous trajectory on the brink of confrontation.
For China, the war was above all a headache. Even though Chinese President Xi Jinping has publicly supported Putin and Russia has managed to resist sanctions thanks to trade between the two countries, Beijing’s material support has been rather limited. Xi did not send weapons. He seems to be growing impatient with Putin’s nuclear tribulations and bravado. China does not want to weaken Moscow and is unlikely to be able to coerce Putin into a deal. But neither does it wish to provoke the Western capitals by being complicit in the invasion. China is watching with caution US allies in Asia, who are strengthening their defenses and seem more determined than ever to stay close to Washington, while wanting to maintain access to Chinese markets. The war has reignited fears of a Chinese assault on Taiwan. But while that invasion already seemed too risky for Beijing in the short term, even before the war, it is – at least for now – even less likely. The heavy sanctions imposed on Russia have not gone unnoticed by China, as have Moscow’s failures on the battlefield.
As for the relationship – between the United States and China – which will dominate the coming decades, the Russia-Ukraine war has not changed its fundamentals. The visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to Taiwan last August annoyed Beijing, but the meeting three months later between United States President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping augured a resumption of dialogue. However, competition between the two countries continues to shape the foreign policies of both countries. Chinese designs on Taiwan are not about to disappear. The world’s two largest economies remain inseparable, but technological decoupling is underway.
The war highlighted the influence and autonomy of non-Western medium-sized powers. Turkey, which has long been on the tightrope between its membership in NATO and its ties with Moscow, has negotiated an agreement with the United Nations to bring Ukrainian grain to world markets via the Black Sea. The move follows years of Turkey reaffirming its position abroad, including tipping the balance of power in clashes in Libya and the South Caucasus and expanding sales of drones. For Saudi Arabia, the abrupt withdrawal of Russian oil from the market has been a boon. He forced Biden to visit Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after he had sworn to ignore him when he took office. Riyadh decided, with other oil producers, to keep prices high, infuriating Washington. India, which is both a US security partner and a big buyer of Russian weapons, has at the same time bought Russian oil at a discount and criticized Putin for his nuclear threats.
It is not a coordinated movement of the non-aligned. But the middle-sized powers claiming their status feel free to chart their own course, and while few favor big-power rivalry, they will seize the opportunities that multipolarity brings. which is both a US security partner and a big buyer of Russian weapons, has at the same time bought Russian oil at a discount and criticized Putin for his nuclear threats.
It is not a coordinated movement of the non-aligned. But the midsize powers that claim their status feel free to chart their own course, and while few favor big-power rivalry, they will seize the opportunities that multipolarity brings. which is both a US security partner and a big buyer of Russian weapons, has at the same time bought Russian oil at a discount and criticized Putin for his nuclear threats. It is not a coordinated movement of the non-aligned. But the middle-sized powers claiming their status feel free to chart their own course, and while few favor big-power rivalry, they will seize the opportunities that multipolarity brings.
Further south, the war has rattled the nerves. Most non-Western capitals voted in the UN General Assembly against Russia’s aggression. But very few have publicly condemned Putin or imposed sanctions. They have good reasons not to break with Moscow, whether mainly over trade, historical ties, or their dependence on mercenaries from the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group. They consider that they have no interest in choosing a side or bearing the costs of a war that many see as Europe’s problem. Frustration with the West also plays a role, whether related to the spread of the Covid-19 vaccine, migration policy or climate injustice. Many see a double standard in the outrage over Ukraine, given the West’s interventions in other countries and its colonial past. Many southern leaders believe, particularly on the issue of sanctions, that Western governments have put their fight against Russia ahead of the global economy.
Indeed, outside Europe, the main repercussions of the war are economic. The financial nervousness generated by the invasion and the announcement of the sanctions sent markets that Covid-19 had already experienced reeling. Food and fuel prices have soared, causing a cost of living crisis. Even though prices have fallen in the meantime, inflation remains galloping, amplifying debt problems.
The pandemic and the economic crisis are two of many threats that, together with climate change and food insecurity, are mutually reinforcing and could hit vulnerable countries and fuel unrest. On this year’s list, Pakistan is the most striking example. Many countries are in the same situation.
Has the year 2022 given reason to be optimistic for the year to come? Given the distress in which Ukraine finds itself, it might seem misguided to seek to see the bright side of the war. But if kyiv had fought back less, if the West had been less united under Biden’s banner, and if Russia had prevailed, Europe, and arguably the world, would be in a more dangerous situation today.
Again. Putin was not the only strongman to weather a tough year. Several populist leaders, whose policies have recently been divisive, have also taken the lead in the wing. Jair Bolsonaro was beaten in Brazil. Former President of the United States Donald Trump appears, for the moment, as a weakened political figure. Marine Le Pen did not win the French presidency.
In Italy, where populists won power, they tended to move closer to the center once elected. Far-right populism is not out of steam, but some of its fervent followers have suffered setbacks. In addition, multilateral diplomacy has, on the whole, done well. Despite their deep differences, China, Russia and Western powers continue to regard the United Nations Security Council as a platform for crisis management. , outside of Ukraine. An agreement that could end the terrible war in Ethiopia and the closer ties forged between Colombia and Venezuela show that conciliation in other countries can find its way despite the events that are shaking Europe. Far-right populism is not out of steam, but some of its fervent followers have suffered setbacks. In addition, multilateral diplomacy has, on the whole, done well.
Despite their deep differences, China, Russia and Western powers continue to regard the United Nations Security Council as a platform for crisis management. , outside of Ukraine. An agreement that could end the terrible war in Ethiopia and the closer ties forged between Colombia and Venezuela show that conciliation in other countries can find its way despite the events that are shaking Europe. Far-right populism is not out of steam, but some of its fervent followers have suffered setbacks. In addition, multilateral diplomacy has, on the whole, done well.
Despite their deep differences, China, Russia and Western powers continue to regard the United Nations Security Council as a platform for crisis management. , outside of Ukraine. An agreement that could end the terrible war in Ethiopia and the closer ties forged between Colombia and Venezuela show that conciliation in other countries can find its way despite the events that are shaking Europe. pulled out of the game.
Despite their deep differences, China, Russia and the Western powers continue to regard the United Nations Security Council as a platform for crisis management, apart from Ukraine. An agreement that could end the terrible war in Ethiopia and the closer ties forged between Colombia and Venezuela show that conciliation in other countries can find its way despite the events that are shaking Europe. pulled out of the game. Despite their deep differences, China, Russia and the Western powers continue to regard the United Nations Security Council as a platform for crisis management, apart from Ukraine. An agreement that could end the terrible war in Ethiopia and the closer ties forged between Colombia and Venezuela show that conciliation in other countries can find its way despite the events that are shaking Europe.
However, the year was disconcerting overall, especially since it is the last in a long series. The pandemic has turned much of the globe upside down. An angry mob stormed the United States Capitol. Temperatures in some parts of the world threaten the survival of humanity. Today, a major war rages in Europe, its instigator raises the possibility of a nuclear escalation, and several poor countries face debt crises, hunger and extreme weather conditions. None of these events happened without warning and yet, a few years ago, they would have been unthinkable. They also come as more and more people are being killedin conflict and that the number of people displaced or suffering from hunger, often as a result of war, has never been so high since the Second World War.
Will the great powers go to war in 2023 or defy a nuclear taboo nearly 80 years old? Will political crises, economic hardship and climate degradation cause social collapse, not just in some countries, but in much of the world? The most pessimistic answers to this year’s big questions seem unfounded. But after these last few years, it would be unreasonable to dismiss the unthinkable.
Ten conflicts to watch in 2023
- Ukraine
- Armenia and Azerbaijan
- Iran
- Yemen
- Ethiopia
- The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes
- The Sahel
- Haiti
- Pakistan
- Taiwan
- Ukraine
So far, Ukraine has withstood the onslaught of Russia, thanks to the valor of Ukrainians and Western aid. But a year after the start of the fighting, there is still no light at the end of the tunnel.
When the Kremlin launched its all-out invasion in February, it apparently expected to rout the Ukrainian government and install a more compliant regime. Miscalculation. Ukraine’s resistance has been as fierce as Russia’s planning has been clumsy. Pushed back from the outskirts of kyiv in the spring, Moscow concentrated its forces in the east and south. Then, at the end of the summer, Ukrainian troops, equipped with more powerful weapons supplied by the West, also advanced in these regions.
Alissa de Carbonnel speaks for Crisis Group with Maxim, a volunteer at the reception center for internally displaced people at Lviv Technical University, Ukraine, June 2022. CRISIS GROUP / Jorge Gutierrez Lucena
Moscow then upped the ante. It mobilized perhaps 300,000 additional troops, but the data is unreliable. The number of Russians who fled the country is at least as high and the army still suffers from a shortage of personnel and equipment. The Kremlin has also announced the annexation of parts of Ukraine, including territories it does not control. He launched a punitive campaign of airstrikes on Ukrainian infrastructure. This attack caused blackouts and many areas became virtually uninhabitable. Almost one in three Ukrainians has been displaced in the past year.
To date, there are no signs that kyiv or Moscow will back down. Ukrainians see every new attack and every revelation of Russian abuses (including summary executions and sexual abuse) as yet another reason to fight. In Russia, propaganda and oppression discourage opposition. Neither side is showing real enthusiasm for starting peace talks. The Ukrainian population is rightly reluctant to cede territories that it has already recovered. Moscow, although it says it is open to diplomacy, continues to demand the capitulation of Kiev and derides the Ukrainian government which it describes as Naziscontrolled by a degenerate West. The escalation orchestrated by Putin after each setback could gradually close his own exit routes.
The stalemate is setting in, but no one knows how long it will last. Both entrenched sides are looking for openings to advance. A new attack on central Ukraine from Belarus, although highly publicized, seems unlikely given the slim chance of success. Moscow hopes that the winter cold and high gas prices, caused by Western boycotts of Russian hydrocarbons, will encourage Europeans to curb their support for Ukraine. But Western unity has so far shown few flaws. Many European capitals are convinced that Ukraine’s defeat would embolden Moscow and put them in danger. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Washington at the end of 2022 confirmed that he has bipartisan support, despite shouting from the right wing of the Republican Party.
Moscow and Western capitals have tried to avoid direct clashes.
As for the truly cataclysmic scenario – a potentially nuclear escalation between NATO and Russia – both Moscow and Western capitals have tried to avoid direct confrontations. The West has, for example, rejected the idea of no-fly zones and refrained from supplying certain advanced weapons. Russia avoided strikes on NATO territory. Putin has mentioned Russia’s nuclear power several times, presumably as a warning to the West, but recently backtracked in his speech. A nuclear strike would serve little military purpose and could trigger the very direct NATO involvement that Moscow hopes to avoid. This possibility, however, cannot be ruled out, particularly if Putin feels he is losing his grip on power. The war has probably created the highest risk of nuclear confrontation in 60 years. It also sets the scene for what could be a long stalemate, with Europe poised for increasingly dangerous showdowns no matter what happens in Ukraine.
Certainly Western leaders should keep the door open to a settlement by impressing on the Kremlin the benefits, including sanctions relief, that would flow from an agreement acceptable to Ukraine. For now, however, they believe that, despite all the horrors of war, it is better to support Ukraine, even at the risk of nuclear escalation, than to let Russia prevail through a brutal military campaign and with a nuclear threat. It’s a difficult calculation to make and it sometimes baffles other parts of the world. But so far it has been good.
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Armenia and Azerbaijan
While the war in Ukraine has had repercussions on crises around the world, its impact has been particularly significant in the South Caucasus. Two years after the last Nagorno-Karabakh war, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to be heading for a new confrontation. Russian incursions into Ukraine have upset regional strategies.
A new war would be shorter, but just as dramatic as the six-week conflict that took place in 2020. This war, which killed more than 7,000 soldiers, saw Azerbaijani forces route Armenians from parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and neighboring areas, all held by Armenian forces since the early 1990s. Moscow finally brokered a ceasefire.
Since then, the balance has tipped even more in favor of Azerbaijan . The Armenian army has not replenished its troops or its stockpile of weapons, as Russia, its traditional arms broker , has run out of equipment. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has increased its numbers. Its army is far superior to that of Armenia, it is much better equipped and enjoys the support of Turkey. The increase in European demand for Azerbaijani gas has also given courage to Baku.
Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine also have an impact on other aspects. As part of the 2020 ceasefire, Russian peacekeepers were deployed to areas of Nagorno-Karabakh still inhabited by Armenians. Russia has reinforced its border guards and military personnel along parts of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border which since the war have become new front lines. The idea was that these contingents, although modest, would deter attacks, because Baku would rather avoid teasing Moscow.
But several flashovers took place last year, despite the presence of Russian forces. In March and August, Azerbaijani troops conquered new territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, including strategic positions in the mountains. In September, Azerbaijani forces invaded territories inside Armenia itself. The attacks have been increasingly bloody.
Historically, it was Moscow that led the pacification efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The war in Ukraine has also put peace talks on the back burner. Historically, it was Moscow that led the pacification efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh. The 2020 ceasefire was meant to open up trade in the region, including restoring a direct routethrough Armenia, from Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhitchevan, on the Iranian border. Improved trade could pave the way for a compromise on the thorny issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s future. (After the 2020 war, Yerevan dropped its decades-old demands for a special status for Nagorno-Karabakh, but it still demands special rights and security guarantees for Armenians living there. Baku, his side, maintains that inhabitants of Armenian origin can enjoy the same rights as any Azerbaijani citizen).
In late 2021, Moscow agreed to the new European Union (EU)-led mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, hoping it would bolster Russia’s peace efforts, which had made little progress. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, however, Moscow has seen EU diplomacy as part of a broader drive to limit Russia’s influence. Despite the perches stretched by the Western capitals, the Kremlin refuses to engage further.
Two draft agreements are therefore currently circulating – one prepared by Russia and the other drawn up by Armenia and Azerbaijan with the support of the West (the two parties proposing contradictory texts in several sections). Each project addresses trade and the stabilization of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, with the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians being left to a separate process that has not yet been initiated. The Western-backed bilateral path is probably more promising, partly because it is local, although Moscow’s reaction should it result in a deal is hard to predict. In any case, the two parties are in very different situations. Baku has all the cards in hand, and in terms of trade and foreign relations,
The risk is that the talks will come to nothing or that a new outbreak of violence will derail both Moscow’s plans and those supported by the West, and that Azerbaijan will take, by force, what he is able to take.
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Iran
Massive protests against the regime, Iran’s ruthless crackdown and arms supply to Russia have left the Islamic Republic more isolated than ever as a crisis over its nuclear program looms.
The protests that rocked the country stand out as the major threat to the authority of the Islamic Republic since the Green Movement in 2009. Tens of thousands of people, mainly young people, took to the streets to defy the regime: on the front line are women and girls of all ages who refuse the compulsory hijab, which they see as a symbol of misogyny and widespread oppression.
The Iranian government responded by killing hundreds of people, including dozens of children. Protesters are being officially executed after trials that human rights groups say are shams. Thousands of people are in prison, where many are subjected to horrific torture. The regime portrays as a plot from abroad what is in fact an expression of popular anti-government sentiment, especially among young people and in the peripheries long neglected by the ruling power. Few people are fooled.
The challenge for heroic young protesters in Iran is to win over their older, middle-class compatriots, many of whom sympathize with them but fear regime violence or sweeping change. More of them could join if the protests manage to reach a critical mass, which is unlikely without their buy-in – unless some other trigger tips the scales or leaders emerge among the protesters. Nothing indicates for the moment that the regime will fracture. But no amount of repression can quell the deep anger of society. Something broke. The regime cannot go back.
Talks to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, stalled since September, are now frozen.
Meanwhile, talks to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, stalled since early September, are now frozen. Tehran’s nuclear capabilities have advanced by leaps and bounds in recent years. She developed her skills to enrich uranium, the countdown to the creation of an Iranian nuclear bomb is now close to zero. Surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency is greatly reduced. The United States and its allies have long hoped to avoid having to choose between the possibility of Iran building a nuclear bomb or using force to prevent it, but that much-dreaded moment may be upon us. the horizon.
Even if they manage to get away with it for a few months, the date of October 2023, when the UN restrictions on Iranian ballistic missiles will expire, will be pivotal. The only solution available to Western leaders to avoid the expiration of these restrictions – which they consider essential to contain the proliferation of missiles and drones by Iran, in particular to help Russia in Ukraine – would be to restore the UN sanctions. This would likely prompt Iran to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty – a potential casus belli for the US and Israel. Any attack on their part against the Iranian nuclear program would risk triggering a spiral of reprisals in the region. And the risks are many:
In this context, it would be wise to keep the door open to diplomacy. The Western capitals, outraged by the Islamic Republic’s repression of its population, exasperated by its arms deliveries to Russia and put under pressure by a part of their electorate which fervently condemns anyonerecommends dialogue, are rightly afraid of working for the survival of the regime by talking to Tehran. They have so far chosen not to break off contact completely – partly because some have to negotiate the release of hostages, but mostly because they keep the nuclear threat in mind. Given the prevailing animosity, the prospects for talks to defuse the nuclear crisis seem bleak. But a better understanding of red lines not to be crossed could help contain tensions until there is more space for de-escalation and substantial diplomatic engagement.
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Yemen
Yemen is in uncertainty. A truce reached in April between the Houthi rebels and the country’s internationally recognized government, which is mainly backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, ended in October. There have been no major clashes yet, but both sides are preparing to resume hostilities.
The UN-brokered truce was an unexpected beacon of hope in a brutal eight-year conflict. In November 2021, the Houthis, who control most of northwestern Yemen, looked close to victory. If they had taken the city of Marib and the surrounding oil and gas installations, they would have won the war in the north, provided their quasi-state with the funds it badly needed and sounded the death knell for the government of the president of the time, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Their offensive was averted when UAE-affiliated forces expelled the Houthis from strategic territories in Marib and neighboring Shabwah in January 2022. The Houthis responded with cross-border missile and drone strikes against the UAE and the ‘Saudi Arabia.
In early April, the UN announced a two-month truce between Hadi’s government and the Houthi.
The resulting stalemate paved the way for mediation. In early April, the UN announced a two-month truce between Hadi’s government and the Houthi. Riyadh, increasingly disillusioned with the war, backed the deal. A few days later, Hadi resigned. It has been replaced by an eight-member presidential council (PLC), hand-picked by Saudis and Emiratis, more representative of the coalition of Yemeni factions fighting the Houthi, and who, almost as often, fight each other. .
Little remains of the initial hopes for a broader settlement. After two extensions, UN-brokered negotiations to extend the truce broke down in early October, scuttled by Houthi demands that the government pay the salaries of rebel military and security forces. (According to sources on both sides as well as within the UN, the government and the Saudis had agreed to pay the salaries of the civilians, but refused to bear the cost of the forces fighting them on the ground).
Even without the truce, the fighting is largely suspended. Major ground offensives and cross-border attacks have not resumed, and talks continue, mainly thanks to exchanges between Houthi and Saudis. But the tension is rising. The Houthis fired what they call warning shots at PLC-controlled oil and gas infrastructure, which led to a halt in oil exports. They claim that oil sales can resume when they and their forces have received their share of the revenue. The government responded by trying to block fuel imports into the Houthi-controlled Red Sea port of Hodeidah, but Riyadh resisted. According to some sources,
The risk of a new war is unfortunately high. In the Houthi camp, some would favor a new offensive, but for now, although they are probably stronger than their rivals, the Houthi are short of funds and their forces are diminished. They could also reach an agreement with the Saudis on the payment of wages, extend the truce and use the time and money gained this way to reorganize. Some Houthi leaders are hoping for a broader deal with Riyadh that would include the Saudis’ withdrawal from the conflict and cement the Houthi’s status as the dominant force in Yemen. But such an agreement, which would ignore the interests of the multiple anti-Houthi factions, already annoyed by their exclusion from bilateral talks, would likely plunge Yemen into a new phase of the war. Even with the Saudis gone, it seems unlikely that the Houthis could easily overrun all of Yemen, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.
A better solution would be a longer truce that could pave the way for intra-Yemeni talks . A real deal must meet the demands of all major Yemeni factions and likely requires UN mediation. But knowing that the Houthis feel they have a vested interest in remaining intransigent and that Iran, the only outside actor with some influence on the group, is in no mood to help, such a deal seems unlikely.
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Ethiopia
One of the most deadly wars of the year 2022, in the Ethiopian region of Tigray and its outskirts, is currently experiencing a truce. Two of the main belligerents – the government of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which dominated Ethiopia’s political scene for decades before Abiy took power in 2018 and then fell out with him – signed an agreement on November 2 in Pretoria, South Africa. Ten days later, they signed another agreement in Nairobi, Kenya. But the lull is fragile. Key issues have yet to be resolved, such as the disarmament of Tigray forces or whether Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, whose army fought alongside Ethiopian troops,
Hostilities erupted in late 2020, when Tigray forces seized a series of national military bases in the region, claiming to preempt a federal intervention. During the two years of clashes, the belligerents were alternately victorious and defeated. A truce reached in March 2022 offered some respite, but it was broken in late August and the war resumed with renewed vigor. The Federal, Amhara and Eritrean forces then once again overthrew the defenses of Tigray.
The record is appalling. Researchers from the Belgian University of Ghent estimate that by August 2022 385,000 to 600,000 civilians had died in this war. Sources on both sides say hundreds of thousands of fighters have died in the clashes since August 2022. All sides are accused of atrocities, but Eritrean forces appear to have been particularly cruel. Sexual violence is commonplace and has reportedly been used as a strategy to humiliate and terrorize civilians. Addis Ababa blocked Tigray for most of the war by cutting electricity, telecommunications and banking services and restricting the supply of food, medicine and other goods.
The Pretoria agreement was a victory for Abiy. Tigray’s leaders agreed to restore federal rule and disarm within a month. Addis Ababa said it would lift both the blockade and the terrorist group designation of the TPLF. In Nairobi, Abiy’s commanders reportedly offered a more flexible disarmament timetable by accepting that Tigrayan forces would give up their heavy weapons as Eritrean fighters and those from the Amhara region withdrew. The truce has held ever since. Aid poured in and federal authorities reconnected Mekelle, Tigray’s capital, to electricity.
The Eritreans, for their part, did not withdraw… The Tigrayans did not surrender either.
But the reversals could be many. The dispute over the fertile frontier lands of western Tigray, which the Amhara call Welkait and claim as their own, is particularly thorny. The Eritreans, for their part, have not withdrawn, although, according to some sources, part of their troops have begun to withdraw. The Tigrayans have not given up their arms either. The parties would now have to coordinate a perilous staging exercise to avoid each blaming the other for being late.
Isaias, Abiy’s ally on the battlefield, couldbecome his main source of torment. In 2018, the peace agreement reached between Abiy and Isaias ended decades of hostility between the two countries, although it also paved the way, to some extent, for the joint offensive of the and Eritrea versus Tigray. Abiy emerged victorious in his fight against the TPLF. But even in this climate of animosity with the leaders of Tigray, he will have to find some form of arrangement to avoid sowing the seeds of a new insurrection. His government will have to determine the role of the TPLF in any provisional regional administration and whether certain Tigrayan soldiers can join the regional forces or reintegrate into the federal army. It is not certain that the Ethiopian Prime Minister recognizes the need for magnanimity.
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes
The M23, a hitherto dormant rebel group, which the United Nations has reported is backed by Rwanda, is wreaking havoc in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The fighting has driven tens of thousands of people from their homes and could turn into a regional proxy war.
The M23 holds control of several towns and surrounds the provincial capital of Goma. In 2013, the group was defeated by reinforced UN troops, but now appears to be well armed and organized. It includes former Congolese soldiers, many of whom are Tutsi, an ethnic group common in the African Great Lakes region, who claim to defend communal interests.
The sudden reappearance of the M23 owes as much to tensions between the states of the Great Lakes as to local dynamics.
The sudden reappearance of the M23 owes as much to tensions between the states of the Great Lakes as to local dynamics. The Congolese government has tried to reassert its authority in the east of the country, plagued by dozens of rebel groups, some of which come from neighboring countries. Last year, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi invited Ugandan troops to fight the Allied Democratic Forces, a majority Ugandan rebel coalition that claims to be a member of the Islamic State. It would seem that the Congolese president has also discreetly approved of Burundian operations on Congolese soil. Rwandan President Paul Kagame did not like it. He considers that the presence of his neighbors risks potentially depriving Rwanda of its influence in eastern Congo, where it has economic interests,
Tshisekedi accuses Kagame of supporting the M23 to be able to extract Congolese raw materials. UN experts also point to Rwandan support for the rebels. A UN report, leaked in December 2022, claims there is “ substantial evidence ” that the Rwandan military intervened directly in Congo’s fight against the M23 and supported the group by supplying them with weapons, ammunition and uniforms. Kigali rejects these allegations and responds by accusing the Congolese army of collaborating with the FDLR (which Tshisekedi denies, despite UN reports confirming this ) .
General elections in Congo in 2023 are likely to further complicate the situation. The vote could allow the country to move a little further away from its two decades of disastrous civil wars. But if voter registration or polling were to be suspended in the east of the country because of the violence, the election results would be tainted. Tshisekedi may also want to step up his anti-Rwanda rhetoric during his campaign, which would endanger minorities that some Congolese already portray as supporters of M23.
In a street in Beni, DRC, a woman walks past a wall tagged “Monusco get out”, calling for the departure of the UN mission in the DRC, December 2021. CRISIS GROUP / Nicolas Delaunay
An East African military mission – minus Rwanda, sidelined by Kinshasa – has a mandate to restore calm to eastern Congo. The UN has a peacekeeping force of 14,000, mostly stationed in Goma, but it seems reluctant to fight the insurgents and is highly unpopular with many Congolese. Kenya, which is part of the regional force, therefore has the unenviable task of fighting the M23.
The long-suffering local population is hopeful that Kenyan troops will succeed in repelling the rebels, but Kenya sees the aim instead as securing Goma and surrounding main roads and pushing the M23 to a ceasefire. -fire. The group could then join peace talks between the Congolese government and dozens of eastern armed groups from which it had been excluded until the fighting stopped.
Securing Rwanda’s buy-in will be crucial, given its influence over M23 leaders. The best chance of achieving this would be concerted diplomacy by East African leaders to restore relations between Kagame and Tshisekedi, which have begun to show some signs of progress , while continuing efforts to counter collaboration between the Congolese army and the FDLR. In other words, the East African force is an opportunity to make room for diplomacy as much as for the fight against the M23.
If this diplomacy fails, Kenyan troops could become bogged down in the hostile terrain of eastern Congo. The deployment of forces from so many neighboring countries in eastern Congo already poses the risk of a return to the proxy wars that tore the region apart in the 1990s and 2000s.
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The Sahel
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger do not appear to be progressing in the fight against determined Islamist insurgencies. Western leaders, whose military involvement over the past decade has done little to stem the violence, do not seem to know how to react to coups in Burkina Faso and Mali.
Burkina Faso is in a most difficult situation. Jihadist groups control around 40 percent of its territory, including large rural areas in the north and east. Insurgents have besieged a major northern city, Djibo, for months. The fighting left thousands dead and drovenearly two million people from their homes. As the casualties pile up, the army is increasingly blamed. Last year, two coups, triggered by massacres of soldiers by insurgents, saw a lieutenant-colonel, Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, take power in January, before being ousted in September by a captain unknown until then, Ibrahim Traoré. Traoré himself finds it difficult to unify divided security forces. He could follow the example of his Malian counterparts by playing on populist sentiment, criticizing France and getting closer to Russia. More worryingly, Traoré is recruiting volunteers to fight the jihadists, which could degenerate into an ethnic bloodbath.
Mali, for its part, suffered two coups in 2020 and 2021. The state is practically absent in the far north. In this area, insurgents affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are fighting among themselves and confronting non-jihadist rebels, who are mostly Tuareg, a community present in much of the Sahel. Tuareg rebels signed an agreement with Bamako in 2015, hoping to secure army posts and a redistribution of power at the local level. But today, feeling abandoned, some rebels could find an interest in joining the jihadists again. (Insurgents linked to al-Qaeda had joined and then usurped a Tuareg separatist rebellion that took control of northern Mali a decade ago). Further south, in central Mali,
The situation in Niger is less dramatic, even if there are also worrying signs.The government either integrated the civilian militias into the security forces or refused to arm them. His willingness to engage with jihadist groups may also have contributed to a lull in violence. Nevertheless, President Mohamed Bazoum survived a coup attempt in March 2021, and subsequent arrests, including among high-ranking officers, may have fueled hostility within the military. The jihadists entered parks and forests along the borders of Burkina Faso and Benin, moving closer to the capital, Niamey.
The West now seems preoccupied with the need to prevent the jihadists from deploying south towards the Gulf of Guinea.
The involvement of foreign powers in the Sahel is changing rapidly. France, which intervened to drive out insurgents from northern Mali in 2013, ended its operations there due to strained relations with Bamako, but it retains bases in Niger. The UN mission, present in Mali since April 2013, has also struggled to make progress. The West now seems preoccupied with the need to prevent the jihadists from deploying south towards the Gulf of Guinea. Anti-French sentiment is spreading in the region, stemming mainly from a decade of failures by the West to hinder insurgent advances, but also from Russian disinformation. The brutality of Wagner’s mercenaries is unlikely to improve the situation,
The region is going through a pivotal moment and it is crucial that the leaders rethink the essentially military approach to the fight against the Islamists. Military operations have a role to play, but they must be subordinated to efforts aimed at restoring inter-communal relations, gaining the confidence of populations in the hinterland and, possibly, opening a dialogue with the leaders of the insurgents. Western governments should be humbled by the record of the past decade. While some Sahelian leaders are turning to Moscow, Westerners would be wrong to cut ties with these countries and try to force them to choose sides.
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Haiti
Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti has been crippled by political stalemate and widespread gang violence. Public services have collapsed and cholera is gaining ground. The situation is so dire that some Haitians are now pinning their hopes on foreign troops, despite the disastrous legacy of previous interventions in Haiti.
Ariel Henry, Haiti’s interim prime minister who succeeded Moïse, enjoys the support of influential foreign powers, but faces strong Haitian resistance. Since taking office, Henry’s government has faced the Montana Accord, a group made up of opposition members and civil society representatives. Henry was supposed to lead the transition to holding elections, but widespread insecurity prevented a vote from taking place, and Henry concurrently sacked the electoral council.
Men react in front of a burning barricade during a demonstration against the rising cost of living and for the eradication of gang violence, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, November 18, 2022. REUTERS / Ralph Tedy Erol
Hundreds of gangs control more than half the country. They suffocate the capital, Port-au-Prince, by blocking the roads and spreading terror, in particular by resorting to rape to punish and intimidate the population , sometimes even attacking children as young as ten years old. . The largest coalition, the G9, is led by notorious gang leader Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier. Haitian gangs have existed for decades, often with ties to politicians. But their power has increased considerably since the murder of Moses.
The situation has worsened over the past six months. In July, fighting between the G9 and another gang for the capture of Cité Soleil, a slum near Port-au-Prince, killed more than 200 people in just over a week. Two months later, Henry removed fuel subsidies, causing prices to skyrocket and sparking mass protests, which gang members joined. The G9 then seized a major oil terminal, leaving almost the entire country plagued by fuel shortages and notably disrupting access to drinking water. Chérizier said he would only vacate the terminal after Henry left, but Haitian police forces managed to retake it a few months later.
The difficulties of access to health centers encountered by humanitarian personnel, combined with a shortage of drinking water, have favored the resurgence of cholera.
This situation has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. Half of the population, or 4.7 million people, suffer from hunger and nearly 20,000 people are at risk of starvation. The difficulties of access to health centers encountered by humanitarian personnel, combined with a shortage of drinking water, have favored the resurgence of cholera. According to a recent report by the World Health Organization, more than 13,000 cases were recorded between early October and early December, with 283 deaths recorded, but these figures are likely to be greatly underestimated.
Faced with these difficulties, Henry requested foreign military support in October. Any such mission will have a tough job fighting off gangs of young men and children based in densely populated urban areas. In addition, there is a strong political opposition: the Montana group is mostly opposed to any mission, believing that the interim prime minister will use it to consolidate his power. Many other Haitians are wary, given the country’s subjugation to outside powers and the mixed record of previous foreign deployments. Yet more and more people, especially in areas most affected by gang violence, have shown their support for this mission in desperation.
The sanctions taken by the United States and Canada against several leading political leaders, currently in office or not, as well as Chérizier, have sent shock waves through the Haitian elites and could incite them to think about their future connections with the gangs. But few foreign countries are eager to deploy troops. That said, if Henry and his rivals can agree on the role of such a mission and on a transitional roadmap, foreign forces might be Haiti’s best hope. Their mere presence and the threat of operations could cause the gangs to abandon the main roads and loosen their grip on the capital.
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Pakistan
Pakistan enters an election year with a deeply divided body politic, as former Prime Minister Imran Khan cultivates grassroots opposition to the government and the all-powerful military.
Khan claimed that Washington was behind a plot to oust him.
Khan’s departure from government last spring coincided with his disgrace in the Pakistani army. After he won power with backing from the top brass, relations soured due to his poor governance, fiery rhetoric against the United States, and attempts to place supporters in high positions in the military. While supporters of a vote of no confidencewere multiplying, Khan claimed that Washington was behind a plot to oust him. The army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, refuted the idea of a conspiracy, worrying about the impact it could have on relations with the United States. He also turned down Khan’s offer to extend his term as army chief indefinitely in a last-ditch effort to win him over. In April, Khan was ousted. A coalition government led by Shehbaz Sharif took over.
Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf , then left parliament and took to the streets. Violent nationwide protests escalated when Sharif’s government rejected Khan’s demand for a snap election. His supporters then also criticized the top brass, especially Bajwa. The anti-Western rhetoric has stoked the anger of a public that was waiting for it. Khan’s claims accusing Sharif of mismanagement of the economy also strike a chord as the cost of living rises.
On November 3, during a weeks-long anti-government march heading for the capital, Islamabad, Khan was shot and wounded . The shooter, apprehended on the spot, claims to have acted alone. But Khan accuses Sharif, a minister and senior military intelligence official of conspiring to assassinate him.
This situation bodes ill for the elections, scheduled before October 2023. The main candidates are already clashing over the rules of the game, and Khan accuses election commission officials of supporting the Sharif government. He seems determined to reject the result if his party were to lose. The military, now under a new command, pledge to stay out of the political fray. But the generals could find it difficult to stay away if the situation unravels or takes a direction they consider threatening.
Pakistan really does not need another political crisis on top of many other difficulties. This year, devastating floods submerged a third of the country, affecting one in seven Pakistanis; 20.6 million people still need humanitarian aid. Credible estimates put the total damage and economic loss at $31.2 billion, and reconstruction will cost at least another $16.3 billion. Women and girls, who are the most vulnerable segments of the population, are among the most affected and see their already limited access to education, income and medical care reduced even further.
The floods forced Pakistan to ask for even more aid.
The terms of the International Monetary Fund ‘s August 2022 bailout, to prevent Pakistan from defaulting, also left Sharif with a dilemma: cancel the bailout and lose it, or implement reforms. painful and risk giving new impetus to Khan’s populism. The floods have forced Pakistan to ask for even more aid, but it is slow to come. Delays in relief and reconstruction could deepen grievances and strengthen Khan’s base.
Meanwhile, Islamist insurgents have resurfaced. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, bordering Afghanistan, has seen insurgent attacks on security forces explode. This upsurge is explained both by the fact that the Taliban protected Pakistani insurgents in Afghanistan and by the fact that Islamabad failed to reach an agreement with the insurgents with the mediation of the Taliban. After hosting Taliban leaders for decades during the US-led war in Afghanistan, Islamabad appears to be struggling to impose its will on its former ally.
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Taiwan
The future of Taiwan, a particularly sensitive subject for the United States and China, seems to become an increasingly thorny question, as Washington seeks to maintain its primacy in the region and Beijing pursues its goal of unification with the Isle.
China has wanted to achieve unification for a long time. Beijing says it hopes this will be done peacefully, but does not rule out the use of force. According to Washington, Xi Jinping has set 2027 as the date when the Chinese army should be able to seize Taiwan . For its part, the United States maintains the policy of a “one China” – aimed at a peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan without prejudging the outcome – and its posture of “strategic ambiguity” as to the possibility of taking the defense of Taiwan. But with Beijing increasingly powerful and confident, Washington is showing signs of toughening policies adopted when China’s military was weaker.
The situation was exacerbated last summer when the outgoing Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi,traveled to Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. As lawmaker, Pelosi does not report to US President Joe Biden (whose government appears to have discouraged a visit). But, predictably, Beijing saw the visit as a strong signal of support for Taipei and a harbinger of eroding US commitment to the “one China” policy. . Beijing has therefore responded by staging unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan and by deploying warships and aircraft beyond the “median line”, considered for decades the unspoken limit of Chinese military activity in the world. Taiwan Strait.
China’s rise in power, its assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region and its desire to strengthen its military capabilities are of growing concern and have become a major concern of US policy. The show of force vis-à-vis China – including over Taiwan – is one of the few issues on which there is bipartisan consensus in Washington. Both the Biden administration and Congress believe that the United States’ ability to deter a Chinese invasion has weakened, and they want to restore that ability.
For the United States government, it is a question of making tangible both the costs that China would incur if it launched a military campaign and the assurance that, in the event that it were to abandon such an invasion, Washington would not seek not to impose a permanent separation from Taiwan.
Breaking through Taiwan’s defenses would be long and difficult…Beijing is probably aware of the international opprobrium and economic cost that such an offensive could entail.
China does not seem ready to invade the country just yet. Breaking through Taiwan’s defenses would be long and difficult, and given the West’s reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing is likely aware of the international opprobrium and economic cost that a such an offensive could result, even if the United States chose not to intervene militarily.
For now, credible threats emanating from the United States are helping to deter Beijing, such as the continued strengthening of Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, and the definition of punitive economic measures with its allies and partners. But these measures must be based on the assurance that the policy of the United States does not change. If Beijing were to believe that by not attacking, it would give Washington and Taipei the necessary leeway to create the conditions for a permanent separation from Taiwan, then its calculation would tip in favor of war.
Biden seems aware of the danger. Although he has a curious streak of pledging to assist Taiwan militarily (his aides were consistently quick to tone down his remarks ), he stuck to the official script when meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping. head-to-head at the G20 meeting in November. He assured Xi that US policy remains unchanged. Xi, in turn, told Biden that China continues to pursue its peaceful unification plan.
Nevertheless, short-term hazards could exacerbate tensions. On the US side, Kevin McCarthy, who led the Republicans when they were a minority in the House, has already said he would visit Taiwan if he succeeded Pelosi as House Speaker. China would then respond at least with displays of military force comparable to the drills it staged after Pelosi’s visit. Should Beijing’s internal economic and political troubles worsen, China might consider showing its resolve more forcefully, especially if it sees the United States playing its advantage at a time when China appears particularly vulnerable.
Such an escalation might not trigger war immediately, but it could push the biggest economic and military powers in that direction.
Courtesy: Crisisgroup.org
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